Talmud for Bava Batra 3:2

“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there⁴Everybody agrees that the common courtyard can be used for private purposes only by the consent of all owners. If the person forbidden by a vow did not object to the other using the courtyard for his private purpose, he would make him a present of monetary value..” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob¹²While the rabbis agree, for them the statement is immaterial since both partners are forbidden entry into the courtyard., for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other¹³If somebody wants to put up an oven or a grindstone in the courtyard, can he presume to have the permission of all inhabitants of the courtyard without asking?? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There¹⁴Mishnah Baba batra 3:6. It is stated there that simply putting a stove, a grindstone, or chickens into a courtyard does not create a presumption of ownership, but building a foundation for the grindstone or an enclosure for the oven does., we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.¹⁵In the absence of documents, a testimony of three years of undisturbed ownership together with a claim of legal acquisition (by buying, inheritance, or gift) entitles the occupant to a documentary title; cf. Yebamot 12, Note 29 (Mishnah Baba batra 3:4).” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing¹⁶He disagrees with R. Jeremiah and the conclusion drawn from the formulation of the Mishnah. The same statement in the Babli, Baba batra 57b. The statement of R. Jeremiah does not appear in the Babli., for the honor of the daughters of Israel¹⁷It cannot be expected that a Jewish woman would go to the river to do her washing there and be seen by everybody without shoes and with uncovered arms.. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash¹⁸If men wash it is a commercial activity and that certainly needs the permission of the other dwellers in the courtyard.. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything¹⁹A strip four cubits wide along the entire front of a house is private property of the owner of the house, not common property of the partners and, as a matter of principle, the owner of the house can do there anything he wants; the mistress of the house can wash there without asking anybody.. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place²⁰That is not a matter of property rights but of torts; the injured party could claim damages.. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership²¹In Mishnah Baba batra 3:6 it is asserted that only a wall of at least ten hand-breadths around an oven or a hearth does count. The text here is very close to Tosephta Baba batra 2:13: Putting an oven or a hearth in a courtyard does not establish a presumption of ownership, but making a roof of any size does.. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua agrees³⁰Even though he held in Chapter 1 that uncorroborated statements are not admissible in court, he agrees that if the question would not arise had a person not pointed it out, the same person is empowered to remove the difficulty he himself created. This is the principle behind the following Mishnaiot of this Chapter. that if somebody says to another: “This field did belong to your father but I bought it from him,” that he is trustworthy since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permits. But if there are witnesses that it did belong to [the second man’s] father and [the first] said, I bought it, he is not trustworthy³¹If there are witnesses, even if they come to court after the first person explained the problem, the first person has to establish his claim following all rules of testimony..

The brother of Rebbi Jehudah bar Zavdi in the name of [Rav]¹⁰⁷This is the reading later in the Halakhah, in Baba batra 3:1, and in the Babli, 73b, against the reading here ר׳ meaning “Rebbi”.: As long as a baby lies in the public domain, either his father or his mother can testify about him¹⁰⁸As long as the baby was not taken up, it is not called a foundling and one of the parents is empowered to declare it his child and not a bastard.. Once he was collected from the public domain, one needs two witnesses; its father and mother are like two witnesses¹⁰⁹Once it is designated a foundling, it needs two witnesses to admit it to the Jewish marriage pool. If two people declare that they are its parents, they really disqualify themselves as witnesses since close relatives cannot testify. Nevertheless, they are admitted as if they were true and independent witnesses.. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rav Ḥisda¹¹⁰In Baba batra 3:1, the rule is attributed directly to Rav Ḥisda. This may support S. Lieberman’s contention that Tractate Neziqin was edited by the rabbis of Caesarea.
In the Babli, 73b, Rava restricts this rule to years of famine or similar situations where the parents may be expected to be unable to care for their child.: That is, if the baby is not moving. But a baby which is moving needs two witnesses; its father and mother are like two witnesses. This parallels what Rebbi Yannai said: property rights on jumping calves and lambs cannot be proven by possession¹¹¹If the ownership of an independently moving calf or lamb is in dispute, one cannot say that the person in whose herd it is at the moment is in possession and any other claimant has to bear the burden of proof since the animal could have wandered with the herd; the situations of both the person in possession and the claimant are equal and ownership has to be proven independently..